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LOYALTY V. LAISSEZ FAIRE: THE 
COACHING CONTRACT CONUNDRUM AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF A NO-
TAMPERING POLICY IN COLLEGE SPORTS 
HEIDI ROCHE∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Wisconsin Badger community was stunned to learn of its beloved 
Bret Bielema’s resignation as head football coach at the University of 
Wisconsin just days before the Badgers participated in the coveted Rose 
Bowl.1  Fostered by a lucrative salary increase and the potential to coach in 
the prestigious Southeastern Conference (SEC), one cannot fault Bielema for 
making the jump.2  However, the Bielema move illustrates an ever-increasing 
problem in college sportsthe “coaching carousel.”3 
While many employers have responded to the recent economic downturn 
by executing mass layoffs and making cutbacks, National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) institutions continue to hire new coaches and open their 
checkbooks to do so.  In the midst of the recession, universities continue to 
entice high-profile coaches to leave their current schools for more promising 
positions, by offering lucrative contracts as incentives.4  In the last decade, 
nearly all of the coaches employed by members of the “Big Six”5 conferences 
 
∗ Heidi Roche graduated from Marquette University Law School in May 2013 and currently 
works as the Compliance Services Office Intern at Stanford University in Stanford, California. While 
at Marquette, she earned the Certificate in Sports Law from the National Sports Law Institute. Heidi 
is a 2009 graduate of the University of Iowa, where she earned her B.A. in Political Science with a 
minor in Business Administration.  
1. Martin Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/behind-the-bielema-jump-dq814pe-184178781.html [herein 
after Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump]; see also Offer Letter from Jeff Long, Vice Chancellor 
and Director of Athletics, Univ. of Ark., to Bret Bielema (Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Bielema Letter], 
available at http://posting.arktimes.com/images/blogimages/2012/12/05/1354725209-bret_bielema_ 
offer_letter.pdf. 
2. Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, supra note 1. 
3. Id. 
4. Id.; see also C.N., Coaching in College Football: Round We Go, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2012, 
11:31 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2012/12/coaching-college-football. 
5. The “Big Six” refers to the following six conferences: the American Athletic Conference 
(formally the Big East), the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the Big Ten, the Big 12, the Pacific 12 
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increased their salaries above the million dollar mark, with a handful of 
coaches making over $5 million.6  Universities are often powerless to stop the 
continual movement of coaches between member schools.  As University of 
California’s Athletic Director Sandy Barbour points out, “[i]f we let [a coach] 
go because we’re not willing to pay market, we’ll pay a huge price.”7 
Thus, a conundrum exists for universities: either pay the ever-increasing 
market price to keep a quality coach in the hopes that the benefits of a 
successful program will outweigh the costs, or lose the chance of obtaining the 
notoriety, five-star recruits, and accomplishments that a high-profile coach 
yields.  Perhaps the solution to this problem lies not with the member schools, 
but with a “higher power,” the NCAA.  Were the organization to implement a 
no-tampering policy, similar to that already in place in the National Football 
League (NFL), which prevents universities from speaking to a coaching 
candidate before the season is over, the lack of loyalty among coaches and 
universities, as well as the outrageous salary provisions, may come to a halt.8  
Sports commentators and media reporters have discussed implementing a no-
tampering policy as a solution to the escalating number of coaches taking a 
ride on the coaching carousel, though no policy is currently in place.9  
However, no good deed goes unpunished.  A no-tampering policy 
promulgated by the NCAA may subject the organization to liability under 
federal antitrust law.10 
This Article discusses the potential antitrust liability the NCAA may face 
for implementing a no-tampering policy similar to that currently employed by 
the NFL.  Part II illustrates the background of the current economic climate in 
college sports, including the escalation of coaching salaries and examples of 
the coaching carousel problem.  Part III provides the options available to 
universities to prevent a coach from breaching his contract by leaving his 
 
(Pac-12), and the SEC.  See Fall Practice Dates, Schedule for Big Six Conferences, SPORTING NEWS 
(July 31, 2013), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2013-07-31/fall-practice-schedule-
start-dates-sec-acc-big-ten-big-12-pac-12-alabama. 
6. USA TODAY Sports College Football Coaches Salaries Database, USATODAY.COM (July 1, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2012/11/19/ncaa-college-football-head-coaches-s 
alary-database/1715543/. 
7. Steve Wieberg et al., Pay Booms in Hard Times, USATODAY.COM, http://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/printedition/news/20091110/1acoachpay10_cv.art.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
8. See Bob Duckens, NCAA Needs to Stop Coaches from Jumping Ship, BLEACHER REPORT 
(Dec. 21, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/312161-ncaa-needs-to-stop-coaches-from-jumping 
-ship. 
9. Id. 
10. See Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics: 
Economic Implications and Legal Considerations, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 
77 (2009). 
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member school prior to the contract’s termination.  Part IV discusses the 
potential of implementing a no-tampering policy in the NCAA as a measure to 
prevent “jumping.”  Part V outlines the proper analysis for an antitrust 
violation in college athletics and analyzes the possibility of antitrust liability 
against the NCAA for the implementation of a no-tampering policy.  Finally, 
Part VI assesses the NCAA’s potential liability for implementing a no-
tampering policy against coaches. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN COLLEGE SPORTS 
Sometime in the last few decades, college sports transitioned from a 
time-honored tradition, respected for its rivalries and cherished for its pure, 
inspiring nature, to an economic commodity.  With this transition came a lack 
of loyalty among players, coaches, and universities.  Moreover, the new 
economic climate created further disparity between the haves and have-nots, 
establishing clear winners and losers, both in terms of universities and 
coaches. 
A.  The Sky’s the Limit—Coaching Salary Escalation in College Sports 
In the current coaching climate, “staying power” assumes new meaning, as 
coaches continually breach their existing contracts in return for higher salaries, 
bonuses, and other additional perks, while universities are left to determine 
their economic fate.  The exponential escalation of coaching salaries came 
swiftly.  In 2006, forty-two coaches made over $1 million annually;11 in 2013, 
the average salary for a head football coach at a Division I school was $1.6 
million.12  This constitutes a 60% increase over seven years.13 
Over the past decade, the escalation in college coaches’ pay even outpaces 
corporate executives who receive their fair share of criticism for their 
staggering compensation packages and outlandish bonuses.14  An article in 
USA Today states, “[b]etween 2007 and 2011, CEO pay—including salary, 
stock, options, bonuses and other pay—rose 23% . . . . In that same period, 
coaches’ pay increased 44%.”15  As the CEOs of college football programs are 
 
11. Erik Brady et al., College Football Coaches Continue to See Salary Explosion, 
USATODAY.COM (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2012/11/19/college-
football-coaches-contracts-analysis-pay-increase/1715435/. 
12. See USA TODAY Sports College Football Coaches Salaries Database, supra note 6.  This 
information is based on a poll conducted by USA Today that analyzes the salaries of 124 head 
football coaches, collected via annual public records requests.  Id. 
13. See id.; Brady et al., supra note 11. 
14. See Brady et al., supra note 11. 
15. Id. 
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enticed by the prospect of multi-million dollar contracts and increased 
notoriety, it is no wonder coaches feel little guilt in taking a ride on the 
coaching carousel, leaving their former universities and players to fend for 
themselves. 
B.  Taking a Spin on the Coaching Carousel 
In the past year, several coaches left their current schools prior to the 
conclusion of their contracts: some as a result of better pay, others for the 
potential to work at a more esteemed program, and many for a combination of 
the two.  According to ESPN, thirty-two coaches, including assistants and 
other football personnel, left the Big Ten in 2013.16  That constitutes nearly 
one-quarter of the coaches gainfully employed by Big Ten universities.17  A 
number of these mass defections came as a direct result of the departure of 
notable head coaches, such as Bret Bielema.  Consequently, one cannot ignore 
the significance of such movements and the intra-institutional tampering that 
causes such upheaval.18 
1.  Tampering—Bret Bielema and the Horse He Rode in On 
Bret Bielema amassed a 73.9 win percentage in seven seasons at 
Wisconsin, including a Big Ten Championship win and three Big Ten regular-
season titles.19  Yet, the prospect of coaching for the most prestigious 
conference in college football, the SEC—not to mention a substantial salary 
increase, plus bonuses—proved too much for Bielema to turn down, and to do 
so with urgency.20  It was announced just days before the 2012 Rose Bowl that 
Bielema accepted a position as the newest head coach of the Arkansas 
Razorbacks,21 a team that finished fifth in the rankings just one year before.22  
Coupled with a $3.2 million annual salary over a period of six years and an 
 
16. Adam Rittenberg, Another Active Year for B1G Coaches Changes, ESPN (Feb. 27, 2013, 
3:30 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/72260/another-active-year-for-b1g-coach-changes; 
see also Adam Jacobi, Big Ten Football: Coaching Suddenly Unstable Once Again, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Mar. 1, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1549718-big-ten-football-coaching-sudden 
ly-unstable-once-again. 
17. Jacobi, supra note 16. 
18. See id. 
19. See Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, supra note 1 (stating Bielema’s record at 
Wisconsin). 
20. See id. 
21. See Bielema Letter, supra note 1. 
22. Arkansas to Pay Bielema $3.2M Per Year, Cover $1M Buyout from Wisconsin, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/21277254/arkansas 
-to-pay-bielema-32m-per-year-cover-1m-buyout-from-wisconsin. 
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additional $700,000 annually in possible incentives, the Arkansas Razorbacks 
agreed to cover the nearly $1 million exit fee owed to Wisconsin.23  As a 
result, Bielema not only gained a significant salary increase and heightened 
notoriety by leaving for Arkansas, but he left his former institution virtually 
unscathed.24 
The same cannot be said of Wisconsin, whose administrators, coaches, 
and fans witnessed their football coach stolen right from under their noses.  
Like most tampering cases, Arkansas took advantage of the early end to its 
season, hiring Bielema while Wisconsin prepared for its upcoming bowl 
game.25  In doing so, Arkansas managed to secure a contract with Bielema 
without the knowledge of the Badger community and without obtaining 
permission from Wisconsin.26  In a press conference discussing the move, 
Wisconsin Athletic Director, Barry Alvarez, noted Bielema’s failure to inform 
him of his decision to move.27  When Bielema offered to fulfill his obligations 
and coach the Badgers in the upcoming bowl game, Alvarez relayed his 
contempt for the manner in which the move took place, stating, “no, Bret, you 
need to go to Arkansas now.”28  Alvarez also did not hesitate to express his 
animosity towards Arkansas’s tampering efforts, stating, “I know the business.  
I know people move.  I was surprised . . . and surprised no one . . . contacted 
me for permission.  There’s some protocol in this.”29 
The Bleacher Report attributes Bielema’s departure to two factors.30  
First, members of the Big Ten struggled as a whole during the 2012 football 
season.31  It notes, “[i]t’s just a lot easier to listen to other job opportunities 
when you’re not having fun, and Big Ten football wasn’t a lot of fun in 
2012.”32  Second, the Bleacher Report observed the Big Ten’s failure to keep 
pace with the rest of college football in terms of paying assistant coaches.33  
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See Tom Lea, Alvarez Not Happy with Lack of Protocol, ESPN WIS. (Dec. 6, 2012), http:// 
www.espnmilwaukee.com/common/more.php?m=49&post_id=16381. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. 
28. Id.  Alvarez, a seasoned football affiliate, took no time mourning the loss of Bielema;  mere 
minutes after learning of the move, Alvarez contacted a potential candidate to fill Bielema’s position.  
Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Jacobi, supra note 16. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  To illustrate, Dabo Sweeney, head football coach at Clemson, recently transferred several 
raises triggered by clauses in his contract to his assistants, making the Clemson assistant coaches the 
highest paid assistant coaching staff in college football, with a cumulative price tag of nearly $4.2 
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While this factor alone may not be enough to sway a coach to leave for 
another school, it is, undoubtedly, a point of contention rival schools will 
address in their offers to coerce a coach to make a switch. 
Bielema’s departure from Wisconsin evidences the growing problem of 
intra-institutional tampering in college athletics.  Not only are universities 
eager to secure replacements for terminated coaches, but coaches are also 
more than willing to confront potential offers.  As was the case with Bielema, 
these contacts are often made without obtaining permission from the current 
employer university.  This practice lends itself to a lack of respect between 
universities, as well as a lack of loyalty between the individual universities and 
coaches.  Anyone, it seems, can speak with whomever, whenever they so 
choose.  Further, prestigious schools in their respective sports, such as 
Alabama in football and Indiana in basketball, will spare no dime in 
attempting to entice coaches away from their current schools and into the arms 
of their suitors, allowing lower revenue-generating schools very little recourse 
in maintaining high-level coaches. 
2.  Dangling the Carrot: The Tom Crean Deal and the Use of Lucrative 
Contract Offers by Rival Universities to Entice Coaches to Flee 
In 2008, Tom Crean left his position as head basketball coach at 
Marquette University for one of basketball’s coveted blue-blood schools, 
Indiana University.34  Crean’s move came as a great shock to the Golden 
Eagles community, as the former head coach had just signed a new contract, 
and specifically assured his former employer of his commitment to stay with 
Marquette for the duration of his contract term.35  In addition, Crean did not 
even wait to let the dust settle in Milwaukee before making the move to 
Indiana.  As the Journal Sentinel notes, Crean alerted Marquette Athletic 
Director, Steve Cottingham, of his decision to leave while Cottingham was 
away for another sporting event.36  Furthermore, Crean’s decision to leave 
broke many promises made to potential players during recruiting, as the move 
would prevent Crean from coaching his highly touted recruits for the duration 
of their careers at Marquette.37 
 
million.  Brady et al., supra note 11. 
34. Second Amendment to Emp't Agreement between Ind. Univ. & Thomas Crean, Head Men’s 
Basketball Coach (Nov. 28, 2012) (on file with author); Associated Press, Crean Signs Deal with 
Hoosiers That’s Worth $23.6 Million Over 10 Years, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story 
?id=3542762 (last updated Aug. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Crean Signs Deal with Hoosiers]. 
35. Todd Rosiak, Crean Becomes a Hoosier, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2008), http:// 
www.jsonline.com/sports/goldeneagles/29396684.html. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. 
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Enticed by the opportunity to join the ranks of legendary coaches such as 
Bobby Knight, Crean accepted the Indiana position with little hesitation38 and 
the University welcomed Crean to Indiana basketball in true blue-blood 
fashion, offering him $23.6 million over a period of ten years.39  Additionally, 
Indiana offered Crean $685,000 as a potential bonus for bringing home a 
national championship, $125,000 for a Big Ten regular-season title, and 
$125,000 for a Final Four appearance.40  Notwithstanding the monetary perks, 
Crean’s contract also affords travel expenses for his family to road games and 
season tickets to both men’s basketball and football games.41  Lastly, the 
contract extends over almost a decade, providing Crean with job security, 
something Crean claims was a deciding factor in signing a new contract in 
such a tumultuous industry.42 
Indiana’s methods to lure Crean away from Marquette are not 
uncommon.43  Most universities use similar ploys to fill a vacant coaching 
position with a highly sought after coach.44  The trend will likely not subside 
anytime soon, as universities continue to offer increasing salaries, bonuses, 
and additional perks.  This creates an increasing level of instability45 in the 
realm of college coaching positions, a problem universities struggle to 
overcome.46  Therefore, those involved in college sports are left wondering 
what options remain for a university to prevent a prominent head coach from 
leaving an institution for “greener pastures.” 
 
38. Crean Signs Deal with Hoosiers, supra note 34. 
39. Id.  In late 2012, Indiana extended Crean’s contract through the 2020 season, increasing his 
annual salary from $2.52 million to $3.16 million.  Associated Press, Indiana Extends Tom Crean to 
2020, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8612449/indiana-hoosiers-sign-
tom-crean-contract-extension (last updated Nov. 10, 2012). 
40. Crean Signs Deal with Hoosiers, supra note 34. 
41. Id. 
42. It is yet to be determined whether Crean’s emphasis on job security will hold true, as most 
coaching contracts offer little solace to coaches when the university decides to suddenly terminate 
their agreement.  Further, while it is unlikely that Crean would leave such a coveted position in the 
near future, it is foreseeable that he would “jump” again were the right terms placed on the bargaining 
table.  Id. 
43. See Paul Myerberg, What Quirks Are in College Football Coaches’ Contracts?, 
USATODAY.COM (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2012/11/20/fbs-head-
coaches-contracts-quirks/1716693/. 
44. Id. 
45. While the instability in college coaching positions does not amount to the automatic downfall 
of a sports program, it does affect recruiting, and it requires coaches and players to take additional 
time to familiarize themselves with their respective positions, as well as one another. Because of the 
short duration of college sports’ seasons, the additional time requirement can “negative[ly] [a]ffect 
. . . the amount of time spent . . . actually improving the team’s level of play,” and in turn, may 
negatively affect the success of both the program and the university.  Jacobi, supra note 16. 
46. See generally Karcher, supra note 10. 
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III.  OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO UNIVERSITIES TO KEEP THEIR CURRENT HEAD 
COACH 
Despite any prior contractual commitments, college coaches are virtually 
free to leave their employment at will.47  However, universities often include 
certain clauses in the coaching contract that inhibit a coach’s ability to leave, 
such as strenuous exit clauses and large buyouts.48  Further, where a 
contractual provision fails to secure the coach’s employment with a university, 
schools can take remedial action, seeking an injunction to prohibit a coach 
from jumping his contract, or liquidated damages when he does.49 
A.  Contractual Provisions Involved When a Coach Leaves 
At the execution of a coaching contract, the parties involved usually 
establish leave provisions in the event a coach does not fulfill the full term of 
his contract, either by termination or dismissal.  Two common provisions 
include exit clauses and buyouts. 
Buyout provisions are standard for college coaching contracts.50  A 
buyout provision affords a coach the right to compensation, in the form of 
damages, when a university terminates employment without cause.51  Due to 
the specified term for which college coaches are employed, coaches are not 
considered at-will employees.52  Thus, any termination of a contract by the 
school without cause entitles a coach to compensation, recognized in most 
industries as severance pay.53 
For example, in 2005, Notre Dame signed the illustrious Charlie Weis to a 
six-year deal as head football coach, and later extended the term of the 
contract through 2015.54  As a result of Notre Dame’s termination of Weis in 
2009 due to poor performance, the Fighting Irish owed Weis a hefty buyout, to 
the tune of $27.7 million.55  While the massive figure owed to Weis seemed as 
though it would weigh down the economic capabilities of the Irish to find a 
replacement, and ultimately lead to another series of down years for Notre 
 
47. WALTER T. CHAMPION,  JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW §16:8 (2012). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See Karcher, supra note 10, at 23–24. 
51. Id. at 23. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Chris Smith, The 10 College Football Coaches Who Should Be Fired in 2012, FORBES (Nov. 
16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/11/16/the-10-college-football-coaches-who-
should-be-fired-in-2012/. 
55. See id. 
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Dame football, it may be a blessing in disguise.56  By firing Weis, Notre Dame 
allowed itself to bring in Cincinnati’s Brian Kelly.57 
In his first two years at Notre Dame, Kelly amassed two winning seasons, 
and went 1–1 in bowl games.  In 2012, the Irish finished with a 12–1 record 
and made an appearance in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) National 
Championship game.58  This national showing afforded Notre Dame a $6.2 
million payday, which the university is not required to share among other 
teams in its conference like most bowl game winners, because Notre Dame is 
notably unaffiliated with a conference in college football.59  Therefore, Notre 
Dame’s performance boost during the Kelly years makes the buyout of Weis 
seem all the more worth it, as Notre Dame will easily recoup the $27.7 million 
owed to Weis as long as they continue to succeed on the field.60 
On the other hand, an exit clause provides that a coach wishing to cut 
short his contractual agreement must provide written notice of the termination 
to the university and must pay an exit fee.61  To illustrate, in the employment 
agreement between Matt Painter and Purdue University, the University retains 
a protective option in the event Painter wishes to exit his contract and leave 
the University.62  Section 5.2 of the employment agreement affords each party 
to the contract the ability to terminate the contract without cause, requiring the 
electing party to purchase the right to terminate for a mutually-agreed-upon 
price.63  As a result, Painter would be required to pay Purdue University a 
specified sum to leave his contract before the contract’s termination.64 
While the exit fee may, on its face, seem substantial enough to prevent a 
coach from leaving, the common practice in the current climate is for the 
interjecting university to help its new hire by covering the cost of his exit 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Notre Dame Football Archive, UND.COM, http://www.und.com/sports/m-footbl/archive/nd-
m-footbl-sched-2012.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
59. Samuel Chi, 2013 Notre Dame Football, BCS Rewards and the Value of Independence, 
SBNATION.COM (Jan 7, 2013), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/1/7/3833196/notre-
dame-football-2013-bcs-national-championship-game/ 
60. See id.  Notre Dame is the second-most valuable team in college football, making it 
substantially easier for them to take such large financial risks than a more middle-of-the-pack 
program.  Id.; see also Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Dec. 22, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2011/12/22/college-footballs-most-valuable-teams/. 
61. Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, supra note 1. 
62. Emp’t Agreement between Matt Painter, Head Men’s Basketball Coach, & Purdue Univ. 
§ 5.2.2 (July 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
63. Id. at § 5.2. 
64. Id.  Urban Meyer is another example; his exit fee for leaving Ohio State is $2 million.  
Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, supra note 1. 
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fee.65  Consequently, a provision calling for an exit fee upon early termination 
of the contractual agreement by a breaching coach does nothing to prevent a 
coach from leaving his current university for another opportunity.  Therefore, 
it may be necessary for the harmed university to resort to legal action to 
protect itself and its program against potential contractual breaches by its 
coaches. 
B.  Remedies for Breach of the Contractual Agreement 
No formal union exists to represent college coaches, nor do coaches 
benefit from the use of a standard employment contract.66  Thus, “[t]he crux of 
the [coaching] contract is whether the coach agrees to perform all duties and 
responsibilities that accompany the position.”67  A coach’s main duty is to 
fulfill the term of his contract, as universities need to ensure a secure, stable 
program.68  Therefore, when a coach leaves the university where he is 
currently employed, a school may seek remedial measures to recoup its losses 
or to prevent or inhibit the move.69 
Universities increasingly seek compensation when a coach breaches his 
contract by leaving prior to the expiration of the agreed upon terms.70  
Typically, this compensation arises pursuant to a liquidated damages 
provision, negotiated at the outset of the contract and, in more recent years, 
paid by the breaching coach’s new institution.71  The amount of a liquidated 
damages clause, similar to a buyout clause, is often greatest when the breach 
occurs early in the coach’s contract term and decreases incrementally as the 
date of the breach approaches the end of the term.72  Normally, the amount 
owed is calculated at the time of the termination using the coach’s base salary 
multiplied by the years remaining on the contract.73  However, courts have 
found the amount calculated under this formula unenforceable when it was 
 
65. Greenberg, Behind the Bielema Jump, supra note 1. 
66. CHAMPION, supra note 47. 
67. Id. 
68. See generally Martin J. Greenberg, Representation of College Coaches in Contract 
Negotiations, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 101, 105 (1992) [hereinafter Greenberg, Representation of 
College Coaches in Contract Negotiations].  Some schools utilize an annuity method for salary 
payments with the possibility of a balloon to ensure longevity.  Id. at 107.  For example, if a coach 
stays at a school for ten years he will receive a $1 million bonus.  Id. 
69. Karcher, supra note 10, at 47. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 48. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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determined to constitute a penalty.74  A penalty exists when a school attempts 
to coerce performance by threatening outlandish fines when a coach fails to 
perform.75  Conversely, no penalty exists when the provision is deemed 
“reasonable in relation to the anticipated damages for [the] breach.”76 
To illustrate, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a 
contractual provision executed between Vanderbilt University and its head 
football coach, Gerry DiNardo, was an enforceable liquidated damages 
provision and did not constitute a penalty under Tennessee law.77  The 
provision required the resigning coach to pay an amount equal to the number 
of years remaining under his contract and multiplied by his annual salary.78  In 
making its determination, the court noted the damage the university would 
suffer beyond the cost of hiring a replacement coach due to his resignation.79  
Further, the court held that Vanderbilt did not waive its contractual right to 
liquidated damages by granting DiNardo permission to speak with a 
competitor university.80  Consequently, it is even more likely that a court 
would find a liquidated damages provision enforceable where the harmed 
university did not grant the breaching coach permission to speak with a 
competitor university.  On the other hand, even when a school succeeds in 
receiving liquidated damages from a breaching coach’s new institution, it does 
not prevent the overarching problem—that the coach left in the first place—
and the university will undoubtedly have to scramble to find a replacement. 
To this end, universities sometimes seek injunctions to prevent a coach 
from negotiating with a competitor and jumping his contract.81  Courts will 
often refuse to grant specific performance as a method of injunctive relief 
where personal service contracts are involved, which include employment 
agreements.82  For example, courts will not order an individual to perform a 
contract because of: (1) the difficulty of supervising and enforcing 
performance; (2) the undesirable nature of compelling continued association 
once loyalties vanish and disputes arise; and (3) the potential violation of the 
 
74. Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755 (6th Cir. 1999).  See generally Richard T. 
Karcher, Redress for a No-Win Situation: Using Liquidated Damages in Comparable Coaches’ 
Contracts to Assess a School’s Economic Damage from the Loss of a Successful Coach, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 429 (2012) (discussing liquidated damages in the college sports context more in-depth). 
75. See Vanderbilt Univ., 174 F.3d at 755. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 753. 
78. Id. at 753–54. 
79. Id. at 756. 
80. Id. at 757. 
81. Id. 
82. Karcher, supra note 10, at 57. 
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Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude by judicially 
compelling services.83  “However, ‘where an employee refuses to render 
services to an employer in violation of an existing contract, and the services 
are unique or extraordinary, an injunction may issue to prevent the employee 
from furnishing those services to another person for the duration of the 
contract,’” known as a negative injunction.84 
Nevertheless, due to its low success rates, the case law analyzing specific 
performance of contracts through negative injunctions in the sports context is 
limited.85  For example, the City of Seattle filed a lawsuit seeking a negative 
injunction that would prevent its professional basketball team, the Sonics, 
from cashing out early and moving to Oklahoma.86  Experts noted it was the 
tradition of the court to allow money damages as a substitute for performance 
and that to overcome this presumption, the City must prove the Sonics’ 
uniqueness—namely that the team brings certain “benefits to the city that 
cannot be calculated in dollars and cents.”87  The parties later signed a 
settlement agreement under which the owners were required to pay the city 
$45 million as consideration for termination of their lease.88  As this case 
illustrates, significant limitations are placed on the current remedies for breach 
of contractual agreements; consequently, the NCAA and its member schools 
must take more drastic steps to ensure effective options exist to remedy a 
coach’s breach of contract prior to termination. 
Moreover, the ease with which one can side step these legal provisions 
evidences the lack of respect for coaching contracts in the college context.  As 
Kevin O’Neill, former head basketball coach at Marquette University, stated 
in regards to his sophisticated contract, “I won’t wipe my nose on the contract.  
It’s not worth the price of the paper.”89  Consequently, it may be necessary for 
schools to look to the NCAA to establish or update its rules to further protect 
universities against the harm caused by a coach who breaches his contract 
prior to its termination. 
 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. (quoting Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367 (N.Y. 1981)). 
85. See City of Seattle v. Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620MJP, 2008 WL 539809, at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2008). 
86. Id. 
87. Jim Brunner, Sonics Trial: What’s Under All the Drama?, SEATTLE TIMES, June 22, 2008. 
88. Settlement Agreement between Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC & City of Seattle (Aug. 18, 
2008). 
89. Greenberg, Representation of College Coaches in Contract Negotiations, supra note 68, at 
109. 
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IV.  RESTRICTING COACHES’ MOVEMENT AMONG MEMBER SCHOOLS: A NO-
TAMPERING POLICY INVOLVING COACHES IN THE NCAA 
 The NCAA has yet to establish a rule directly prohibiting tampering 
between coaches and member universities.90  However, recent discussions 
regarding the current landscape in college sports suggest that the 
implementation of a no-tampering policy by the NCAA may not be far off.91  
Further, the NCAA already promulgated a no-tampering rule in regards to its 
players; therefore, it is reasonably conceivable that the NCAA would 
implement a similar policy prohibiting tampering with coaches in the near 
future. 
A.  Current Tampering Restrictions and the Potential for a No-Tampering 
Policy for Coaches 
Were the NCAA to implement a no-tampering policy in regards to its 
coaches, it should model its rule based on the current no-tampering policy 
employed by the NFL,92 as well as the NCAA’s transfer rule regulating 
tampering among universities for players.93 
The NCAA’s current transfer rule prohibits a university from contacting a 
player without the express permission of the university that the athlete is 
currently attending.94  Moreover, an athlete who chooses to transfer schools 
must sit out one season of competition, unless he obtains a waiver due to one 
of the rule’s limited exceptions.95  The rationale behind this rule is to 
encourage student-athletes to make the decision to transfer based on 
academics, instead of making a decision motivated solely by athletics.96  The 
overall goal of the transfer rule is to assure that athletes make rational 
decisions about the best place to receive an education and to compete in their 
 
90. See generally 2012–2013 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2012) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. 
91. See Duckens, supra note 8. 
92. See Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the National Football League: A 
Market Survey and Legal Review, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 126−34 (2006). 
93. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 90, art. 13.1.1.3. 
94. Id.; see also Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Membership Modifies Transfer Waiver Guidelines, 
NCAA.ORG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+ 
News/2012/November/Membership+modifies+transfer+waiver+guidelines; Get the Facts About 
Transfers, NCAA.ORG (May 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/ 
Latest+News/2012/May/Get+the+facts+about+transfers. 
95. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 90, art. 14.1.8.1. 
96. Transfer Rules: Basic Guidelines, NCAA.ORG (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/Transfer+Rules+Basic+Guidelines. 
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respective sport free from interference by on-going recruiting attempts.97 
A no-tampering rule regulating contact between currently employed 
coaches and other member universities should be promulgated to reach a 
similar end that coaches would make the decision to switch schools based on 
the best environment to cultivate and portray their coaching skills, rather than 
a decision motivated by financial gain.  The NCAA could even include a non-
compete clause, requiring leaving coaches to refrain from coaching for a year; 
the same penalty placed on players who decide to transfer.98  The result: a 
college sports environment that appropriately balances the realistic 
advancement opportunities for coaches, while protecting the rights of 
individual member universities to maintain and operate a stable, successful 
program, the same result arguably achieved by the NFL in establishing its no-
tampering policy.99 
The NFL’s current no-tampering policy establishes the framework for 
NFL teams to consider candidates for coaching jobs.100  The policy applies to 
both players and coaches.101  The NFL rule regulating player-tampering states, 
“[n]o club, nor any person employed by or otherwise affiliated with a club, is 
permitted to tamper with a player who is under contract to or whose exclusive 
negotiating rights are held by another club.”102  According to the NFL, 
tampering includes “any interference by a member club with the employer-
employee relationship of another club or any attempt by a club to 
impermissibly induce a person to seek employment with that club or with the 
NFL.”103  For example, any statement of interest, made publicly or privately, 
to another club’s player, to that player’s agent or representative, or to a 
 
97. Id.  However, the transfer rule does not eliminate all problems with tampering, as universities 
often block the transfer of student-athletes by prohibiting contact with players solely to tamper with 
another university’s prospects, especially at the Division I level.  See Coaches Say Only Reason to 
Block Transfer is Tampering, SPORTING NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.sportingnews.com/ ncaa-
basketball/story/2012-04-20/bo-ryan-jarrod-uthoff-john-calipari-mark-few-jim-boeheim-coaches-say-
only-reason; Missouri Denies Allegation of Khem Birch Tampering, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 29, 
2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/story/2011-12-29/ex-pitt-center-khem-birch-nar 
rows-transfer-list; John Infante, Transfer 101, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/blog/ 
2012/01/transfer-101/.  Moreover, much discussion has existed in recent years about the potential 
elimination of the transfer rule.  Dana O’Neil, NCAA: It’s Time to Look at Transfers, ESPN (July 13, 
2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8157631/ncaa-turns-attention-transfers-
eye-penalties-tampering. 
98. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 90, art. 13.1.1.3. 
99. See Lattinville & Boland, supra note 92, at 127. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 126. 
102. NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY 2 (2009), available at  http://www.dawgtalkers.net/uploads/ 
2009%20NFL%20Anti-Tampering%20Policy.pdf. 
103. Id.; see also Lattinville & Boland, supra note 92, at 127. 
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member of the news media, is a violation of this policy.104  The goal of the 
policy is “to protect member clubs’ contract and negotiating rights [while 
allowing] the intra-League competitive systems devised for the acquisition and 
retention of player talent (e.g., college draft, waiver system, and free-agent 
rules under an operative collective bargaining agreement) to operate 
efficiently.”105 
Moreover, the NFL prohibits tampering with head coaches.  The pertinent 
language states: 
During a club’s playing season, including postseason if 
applicable, . . . the following actions are prohibited concerning 
a head coach who is under contract, unless . . . [previously] 
dismissed by his club: (1) [n]o head coach may discuss or 
accept employment for the current or a future season with 
another club in the [NFL]; (2) no club may request permission 
to discuss employment with a head coach for the current or a 
future season; and (3) no . . . club may grant another club 
permission to discuss employment with its head coach for the 
current or a future season.106 
The goal here is to provide realistic opportunities for advancement in the 
workplace, while protecting the success of an individual member.107 
The fact that the NFL rule applies to both players and coaches becomes 
more significant when one considers that the NCAA already has a no-
tampering policy that applies to players through its transfer rule.108  The 
purpose for promulgating a no-tampering rule in the NFL applies with equal 
weight to coaches and athletes; thus, it seems the NCAA’s current rule misses 
the mark in leaving out protections against tampering with coaches.  It seems 
obvious that, to slow the coaching carousel, the NCAA must include a no-
tampering rule for coaches.  However, antitrust principles may dictate that a 
no-tampering policy acts as an unreasonable restraint on trade. 
V.  ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prevents concerted action that acts 
 
104. Mike Sando, West Mum on Peyton; Did Chiefs Cross Line?, ESPN (Feb. 25, 2012, 5:12 
PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/tag/_/name/anti-tampering-policy. 
105. NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY, supra note 102, at 1; see also Lattinville & Boland, supra 
note 92, at 127. 
106. NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY, supra note 102, at 6. 
107. Lattinville & Boland, supra note 92, at 127. 
108. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 90, art. 13.1.1.3. 
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as an unreasonable restraint on interstate trade or commerce.109  The “purpose 
of the antitrust laws is to preserve a competitive marketplace to ensure that 
consumers receive the benefits of economic competition.”110 
The NCAA plays an important role in the regulation of collegiate sports, 
adopting and promulgating rules that influence facets of college athletics such 
as the rules of play, the standards of amateurism and eligibility, the recruiting 
regulations, and the rules controlling the size of coaching staffs and athletics 
squads.111  However, the NCAA is also involved in many commercial aspects 
of college sports, including the regulation of expenditures at member 
institutions.112  Therefore, despite the amateur nature of intercollegiate 
athletics, any institutional rule that limits or regulates a commercial aspect of 
college sports is subject to antitrust laws.113 
A.  Background of Antitrust Law in College Sports 
To satisfy a claim for an antitrust violation, the claimant must show that 
the restriction came as a result of concerted action, the effect of which is an 
unreasonable restraint on interstate trade or commerce.114  The NCAA is 
comprised of 1066 member schools, spanning from coast to coast.115  As a 
result, any economic interaction between the NCAA and its member schools 
constitutes interstate commerce.116  Moreover, concerted action exists where 
parties that would otherwise be competitors agree to a given restraint.117  The 
NCAA promulgates its rules through the concerted decision-making of its 
competing member schools;118 therefore, as long as the NCAA is viable, 
concerted action will exist between the NCAA and its member schools. 
Next, to succeed in finding an antitrust violation, a claimant must establish 
that the regulation creates an unreasonable restraint on trade.119  Two cases, 
 
109. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); see also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2013). 
110. Matthew J. Mitten et al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 829–30 (2010). 
111. Marc R. Leduc, Note, Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Guide to How 
Courts Will Treat Future Antitrust Challenges to NCAA Regulations, 26 J.C. & U.L. 139, 140 (1999). 
112. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 90, art. 16.01. 
113. Mitten et al., supra note 110, at 829–30. 
114. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
115. About the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About 
+the+NCAA/Membership+NEW (last updated Aug. 13, 2012). 
116. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
117. See  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. 
118. Id. at 88–89. 
119. Id. at 98; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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NCAA v. Board of Regents and Law v. NCAA, establish the proper analyses for 
determining whether a restriction constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade 
in college sports.120  These analyses include: per se, rule of reason, and quick 
look.121 
A per se analysis is appropriate where an alleged restraint is entirely void 
of redeeming competitive rationales.122  Under this approach, horizontal 
restraints and limitations on output are condemned as a matter of law because 
“the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high . . . [that] 
‘the practice [on its face] appears to be one that would always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’”123  When a practice 
is deemed per se illegal, a court does not need to examine the impact of the 
practice on the market, or any pro-competitive justifications of the practice 
advanced by the defendant, before finding a violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  Instead, a conclusive presumption exists that the practice is 
unreasonable.124 
However, in Board of Regents, the Court noted that the essence of sports 
is competition itself; thus, a rule of reason analysis must be utilized in antitrust 
claims involving college sports, as horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.125  The rule of reason requires 
an analysis of the restraint’s effect on competition.126  First, the court must 
determine whether competition was substantially adversely affected by the 
challenged restraint.127  If shown, the inquiry shifts to “an evaluation of 
whether the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct justifies 
the otherwise anticompetitive impacts.”128  If a defendant meets this burden of 
proof, the burden is placed back on the plaintiff to prove that the challenged 
conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objectives, or that the 
legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive 
manner.129 
A plaintiff may show adverse effects on competition “indirectly by 
 
120. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
121. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85; Law, 134 F.3d 1010. 
122. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04. 
123. Id. at 100 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1979)). 
124. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04. 
125. Id. at 100–01. 
126. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
127. Id. at 1017. 
128. Id. 
129. Id at 1019. 
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proving that the defendant possessed the requisite market power within a 
defined market or directly by showing actual anticompetitive effects, such as 
control over output or price.”130  The best way to show actual anticompetitive 
effects is by comparing what would happen in the free market to what is 
currently happening with the restraints in place.131  In a free market, outputs 
and prices change in response to consumer supply and demand.132  In college 
sports, however, anticompetitive effects sometimes exist where the NCAA 
imposes horizontal restraints, including reduced individual freedom to 
compete, higher prices, and lower output.133  These consequences exist not as 
a response to consumer preference, but as a direct result of the regulation.134 
For instance, in Board of Regents, the Court found that “if member 
institutions were free to sell television rights, many more games would [be 
televised]”; consequently, the restriction on output by the NCAA had the 
effect of raising the price networks paid for these television rights.135  
Moreover, the Court found that by setting a fixed price for the television rights 
to college football games, the NCAA created a price structure unresponsive to 
viewer demand and unrelated to prevailing prices in a freely competitive 
market.136  Furthermore, the NCAA must approve all participating members; 
as a result, member institutions have no choice but to adhere to NCAA rules 
and controls.137  Additionally, the court in Law held that a restricted-earnings 
rule limiting compensation of certain entry-level coaches was an unreasonable 
restraint because it constituted impermissible price-fixing.138  There are other 
factors that are considered in determining whether the effects of a given 
regulation were a result of consumer supply and demand or whether other 
forces were at work.139  For instance, courts often look to a defendant’s 
geographical market, a defendant’s market share, and any other reasonable 
 
130. Id. 
131. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
132. See generally Koshy Mathai, Monetary Policy: Stabilizing Prices and Output, IMF, http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/monpol.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2012). 
133. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106–07. 
134. Id.  The NCAA has argued that its horizontal regulations create “no significant 
anticompetitive effect since the record indicates that . . . [the institution] has no market powerno 
ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand.”  Id. at 109.  However, the Court noted that “the 
absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”  Id. 
135. Id. at 105. 
136. Id. at 106. 
137. Id. 
138. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). 
139. See id. at 1019. 
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substitutes available.140 
The NCAA is the premier governing body in college athletics, regulating 
all Division I, II, and III member schools.141  The “product” made available by 
the NCAA is college athletics.142  Through its regulation of numerous aspects 
of college sports, ranging from competition to media rights, and its control 
over all major college athletic programs, the national governing body retains 
the entire market share for its “product.”143  Moreover, NCAA member 
schools span from coast to coast; as a result, the governing body monopolizes 
the college sports product within its relative market, which in this instance is 
nationwide.144  Therefore, the NCAA’s premiere status in college athletics 
nationwide, coupled with its ever-increasing share of the product market, 
creates indirect adverse effects on competition, unresponsive to consumer 
demand. 
The NCAA has argued that its horizontal regulations create “no significant 
anticompetitive effect since . . . [the institution] has no market powerno 
ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the market.”145  
However, the Court in Board of Regents noted “the absence of proof of market 
power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”146  Therefore, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint has significant or 
actual pro-competitive redeeming effects.147 
The NCAA may survive antitrust scrutiny if it can justify the 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint with the pro-competitive benefits.148  
As previously stated, the Court in Board of Regents recognized that certain 
horizontal restraints by the NCAA are justified under antitrust law because the 
product, college sports, would not exist without them.149  Legitimate 
rationales for a given restraint, supported by the courts, include amateurism 
 
140. Id. 
141. About the NCAA, supra note 115. 
142. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1018. 
143. Two other governing bodies, the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) 
and the National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA), regulate college athletics; however, 
the NCAA remains the premier governing body, regulating all of the major Division I-III programs 
across the country.  See National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, NAIA, http://www.naia.org 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013); National Junior College Athletic Association, NJCAA, http://www.njcaa. 
org (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
144. Who We Are, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ 
ncaa/who+we+are+landing+page (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
145. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984). 
146. Id. 
147. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
148. Id. at 1021. 
149. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. 
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and competitive balance.150  If pro-competitive effects are shown, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objectives, or that the legitimate 
objectives can be achieved in substantially less restrictive manner.151 
Lastly, a quick look analysis is used when “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements 
in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets.”152  Where these obvious anticompetitive effects exist, the court will 
dispense of the elaborate market analysis.153  For example, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a league’s television plan expressly limiting output 
so clearly demonstrated anti-competitive effects that it dispensed with market 
definition and assessment of market power determining the restraint was 
unreasonable.154 
B.  Analysis of a No-Tampering Rule Under Antitrust Rules 
The NCAA, reluctant to enact cost-control legislation following the 
decision in Law,155 delegates to its member institutions the responsibility of 
making financially responsible decisions regarding the expenditures of their 
athletic programs.156  However, seeing the explosion of salaries in college 
coaching contracts, the NCAA may soon be compelled to enact restrictions to 
better monitor and impede these large expenditures and intra-institutional 
tampering.  Yet, the implementation of a no-tampering policy by the NCAA 
will likely yield effects that create a horizontal restriction on output, a clear 
restraint on trade in violation of antitrust law. 
To prove an antitrust violation, a claimant must show that the restraint was 
the result of concerted action that unreasonably restrains interstate trade or 
commerce.157  Concerted action exists when otherwise would-be competitors 
agree to a restraint.158  If implemented, the NCAA would promulgate its 
 
150. Id. at 118. 
151. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
152. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
153. Id. 
154. See generally Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). 
155. See generally Leduc, supra note 111 (describing NCAA procedure). 
156. See generally Christopher Schnaars et al., USA Today Sports’ College Athletics Finances, 
USATODAY.COM, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-ath 
letics-finances-database/54955804/1 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
157. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); see also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C 
§ 1 (2013). 
158. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. 
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restriction against tampering through the concerted decision-making of its 
member schools.159  Moreover, NCAA member schools constantly compete 
with one another on and off the field.  Therefore, concerted action exists.  
Further, the restraint must affect interstate commerce.160  As previously stated, 
NCAA member schools span from coast to coast; thus, any economic 
regulation imposed by the institution on its members affects interstate 
commerce.161 
Most importantly, a party bringing an antitrust claim must prove that the 
restraint unreasonably restrains trade.162  As previously stated, the Court, in 
Board of Regents, elicited that all antitrust analyses involving collegiate sports 
should fall under the rule of reason.163  Therefore, the burden initially falls on 
the claimants, most likely the coaches themselves, to prove that the no-
tampering restriction creates anti-competitive effects.164  In this instance, a no-
tampering policy, promulgated by the NCAA, would result in anticompetitive 
effects because the prohibition on contacting coaches without consent of the 
current employer would undoubtedly result in a restriction on output, a direct 
anticompetitive effect.165 
To illustrate this restriction on output, it is helpful to determine what result 
would occur in a free market, absent the restriction.  Were market forces free 
to function in response to consumer supply and demand, coaches would be 
free to entertain countless offers by competing member schools, leaving a 
saturated product market.166  To the contrary, a no-tampering policy would 
limit the number of available coaches in the product market.  Without the 
ability of competing member schools to speak freely to coaches, schools will 
be forced to wait until the end of the season to compete for the coaches’ 
services, if the services are available at all due to the requirement of consent.  
This effect is clearly unresponsive to consumer demand, as the demand for 
 
159. Id. at 88–89. 
160. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
161. About the NCAA, supra note 115. 
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163. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–03; see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
164. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1017. 
165. Id. at 1019. 
166. See Eye on College Football Staff, CFB Coaching Carousel One-Stop Shop, CBSSPORTS 
.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/eye-on-college-football/20838 
606; see also Coaches Say the Only Reason to Block Transfer is Tampering, supra note 97.  The only 
incentive for blocking a transfer is to tamper with another school’s prospects.  Id.  The same would be 
true of coaches; therefore, without the restriction, coaches are free to engage in communications 
regarding employment with an unlimited number of schools.  Id. 
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high-profile college coaches is at an all-time high.167 
Consequently, the burden must shift to the NCAA to prove significant pro-
competitive, redeeming effects of the no-tampering policy.168  Here, the 
NCAA’s most effective argument relies on the goal of competitive balance 
between member schools.  To provide an equal-playing field for all of its 
member schools, the NCAA must promulgate legislation that places some 
horizontal restrictions on its members.  To reiterate the Court’s sentiments in 
Board of Regents, certain horizontal restraints, such as restrictions on 
eligibility, are justified under antitrust law because the product, college sports, 
would not exist without them.169  Allowing schools with higher payrolls to 
monopolize the most talented coaches provides these high revenue-generating 
schools with the recruiting benefits, notoriety, and skill associated with high-
profiles coaches, to the disadvantage of lower revenue-generating institutions.  
Furthermore, the Court, in Board of Regents, specifically listed competitive 
balance as a legitimate rationale for these types of restraints.170  Accordingly, 
the NCAA can satisfy its burden of proving pro-competitive effects of the 
alleged restraint, and the burden can shift back to the plaintiff coaches to show 
that the legitimate objectives sought by the NCAA can be achieved through 
less restrictive means.171 
Although the NCAA has a legitimate interest in preventing these lucrative 
salary offers and reinstating some loyalty back into college sports, a no-
tampering policy is likely too restrictive a means of reaching its goals.  For 
example, a much less restrictive method of achieving the NCAA’s goals 
would be to prevent interfering schools from paying their newly acquired 
coach’s exit fees, placing a more significant burden on coaches for breaching 
their current contract and potentially preventing the coaching carousel from 
spinning at such a swift pace. 
Due to the ability of the NCAA to achieve its goals of reduced coaches’ 
movement and lucrative salary offers through less restrictive means, the 
claimant coaches effectively meet their burden of proof.  Therefore, a no-
tampering policy implemented by the NCAA against its member coaches will 
result in a violation of antitrust law. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Many schools may not be as fortunate as Wisconsin to quickly substitute a 
legend, such as Barry Alvarez,172 to coach in one of the most coveted football 
games in college sports.  If the NCAA neglects to put measures in place to 
stop the coaching carousel, institutions will continue to pay increasingly large 
salaries to obtain or keep high-profile coaches.  To prevent these movements 
and excessive salaries, some have hinted that the NCAA should implement a 
no-tampering policy, prohibiting member schools from interfering with an 
existing contractual coaching relationship until the playing season is complete, 
or the contract is terminated. 
Based on the decisions in Board of Regents and Law, it is likely that a no-
tampering policy would result in a violation of antitrust law.  Although the 
limitation on coaches’ salaries effectively restricts output, the NCAA can 
justify its restriction through legitimate pro-competitive interests, namely 
competitive balance.  However, coaches may successfully argue that the 
objectives sought by the NCAA could be achieved through less restrictive 
means. 
As a result, the current problem of coaches jumping to other member 
schools before the termination of their contracts will continue, and the NCAA 
will undoubtedly remain helpless to stop it.  The only foreseeable solution to 
this problem may come if individual member schools decide not to partake in 
tampering activities.  However, the continued pressure on university athletic 
departments and officials to produce and maintain a successful, self-sustaining 
athletic program makes any possibility of individual university’s compliance 
minimal at best.  Consequently, the era of hefty coaching contracts and 
fictional loyalty from coaches will continue well into the future. 
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